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Abstract
The theory of international trade has paid scant attention to market institutions. Neither
neoclassical theory nor new trade models typically specify the process by which supply and
demand meet. Yet in the real world, intermediaries play a central role in materializing the
gains from exchange outlined by standard trade theories. In Antr￿s and Costinot (2010), we
have developed a stylized but explicit model of intermediation in trade. In this short paper, we
present a variant of this model that illustrates the potential role of intermediaries in facilitating
the realization of the gains from trade.
￿Antr￿s: Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, pantras@fas.harvard.edu. Costinot: MIT, Cambridge, MA,
costinot@mit.edu. We thank Jon Eaton, Emmanuel Farhi, Gita Gopinath, and Steve Redding for comments. This
paper has been prepared for the 2010 American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings.1 Introduction
The theory of international trade has paid scant attention to market institutions. Neither neoclas-
sical theory nor new trade models typically specify the process by which supply and demand meet.
Yet in the real world, intermediaries play a central role in materializing the gains from exchange
outlined by standard trade theories; see e.g. Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson (2004) as
well as the other papers included in this session for recent evidence.
In Pol Antr￿s and Arnaud Costinot (2010), AC hereafter, we have developed a stylized but
explicit model of intermediation in trade. In this paper, we present a variant of AC that illustrates
the potential role of intermediaries in facilitating the realization of the gains from trade. We consider
a Ricardian model with two goods and two countries. Our only point of departure from this standard
model is to assume that producers do not have a direct access to centralized (Walrasian) markets.
Instead, producers must be matched with a trader in order to have access to these markets. Upon
matching, producers and traders bargain bilaterally.
Using this simple model, we contrast the implications of changes in the integration of Walrasian
markets, which we refer to as W-integration, with the implications of changes in the access to these
markets, which we refer to M-integration. The former type of integration aims to shed light on
the consequences of convergence in goods prices across countries in the presence of intermediaries,
while the latter seeks to capture the consequences of the entry of foreign intermediaries in local
markets, whether such intermediaries are trading companies, banks, or multinational companies in
practice.
We ￿nd that W-integration produces e⁄ects similar to those in the standard model, and in
particular, makes all agents in the world (weakly) better o⁄, despite the fact that our model features
two distinct types of agents. By contrast, we show that M-integration has opposite e⁄ects on the
steady-state welfare of farmers and traders and may lead to aggregate losses from trade. Although
M-integration resembles a form of factor migration in neoclassical trade models, the potentially
perverse welfare e⁄ects of this type of integration stem from a new and distinct channel, which
does not require any worsening of a country￿ s terms of trade. To us, these admittedly stylized
results point towards the importance of explicitly modelling market institutions in an international
context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the basic environment. Section
II characterizes the steady state equilibrium under autarky. Section III analyses the consequences
of W- and M-integration. Section IV concludes by brie￿ y describing how our analytical results may
help shed light on the consequences of agricultural trade reforms in Africa.
2 The Basic Environment
Preferences. Consider an island inhabited by a continuum of in￿nitely lived agents with mass N
that consume two goods, co⁄ee (C) and sugar (S). Agents aim to maximize the expected value of
1their lifetime utility
V = E
￿Z +1
0
e￿rtv (C(t);S(t))dt
￿
;
where v is increasing, concave, homogeneous of degree one and satis￿es standard Inada conditions.
Under these assumptions, both goods are essential in consumption: v (0;S) = v (C;0) = 0 for all
C and S.
Endowments and Technology. There are two types of agents, farmers (F) and traders (T). We
denote by NF and NT the measures of farmers and traders on the island. Farmers are endowed
with a plot of land that allows them to grow an amount 1=aC of co⁄ee or an amount 1=aS of sugar
per unit of time. Goods are not storable and a farmer is unable to grow both goods at the same
date t. We denote by ￿ 2 [0;1] the endogenously determined share of farmers growing co⁄ee at a
given date. In order to be able to sell part of their output and consume both goods, a farmer needs
to ￿nd a trader, and doing so may take time due to search frictions. Traders are not endowed with
land but have the expertise necessary to access centralized (Walrasian) markets in which co⁄ee and
sugar are exchanged under competitive conditions. We denote by p ￿ pC=pS the relative price of
co⁄ee in that market.
Matching. Farmers and traders can be in one of two states, matched (M) or unmatched (U). We
denote by uF and uT the mass of unmatched farmers and traders at any point in time. Unmatched
farmers and traders come together randomly. The number of matches per unit of time is given by a
matching function, m(uF;uT), which is increasing, concave, homogeneous of degree one and satis￿es
standard Inada conditions. The associated rate at which unmatched farmers meet unmatched
traders is equal to ￿F (￿) ￿ m(1;￿), with ￿ ￿ uT=uF. The rate at which unmatched traders meet
unmatched farmers is in turn given by ￿T (￿) ￿ m(1=￿;1) = ￿F (￿)=￿. We refer to ￿ as the level of
￿ intermediation￿on the island. We also assume that existing matches are destroyed at an exogenous
Poisson rate ￿ > 0.
Bargaining. When a farmer and a trader form a match, they negotiate the (relative) price at
which the trader will purchase the output in the hands of the farmer. This ￿ farm-gate￿price will
naturally di⁄er from the competitive one (p) and will re￿ ect the (primitive) bargaining power of
agents as well as their outside options. We model these negotiations by means of the generalized
Nash bargaining solution, and assume that traders capture a fraction ￿ of the ex-post gains from
trade. Because both parties have symmetric information, bargaining will be (bilaterally) e¢ cient.
Let V M
Fi denote the value function of a farmer matched with a trader and producing good i = C;S;
and let V U
F denote the value function of an unmatched farmer. Similarly, let V M
Ti denote the value
function of a trader matched with a farmer carrying good i; and V U
T denote the value function of
an unmatched trader. Formally, the Nash bargaining consumption levels of a farmer-trader match
with good i, (CFi;SFi;CTi;STi), solve
max
CFi;SFi;CTi;STi
￿
V M
Ti ￿ V U
T
￿￿ ￿
V M
Fi ￿ V U
F
￿1￿￿
2subject to pCFi + SFi + pCTi + STi ￿ (p=aC) ￿ IC + (1=aS)(1 ￿ IC), where IC = 1 if the farmer
carries co⁄ee and IC = 0, otherwise. The negotiated bilateral relative price can easily be retrieved
from these consumption levels.
Timing of Events. Each date t is divided into two periods. In the ￿rst period, farmers decide
which goods to produce and matched farmers and traders bargain over the exchange of goods.
In the second period, matched traders carry out transactions in Walrasian markets, consumption
takes place, new matches are formed among unmatched agents, and a fraction of existing matches
is dissolved exogenously.
3 Steady State Equilibrium
We de￿ne a steady state equilibrium as: (i) a relative price, p; (ii) a share of co⁄ee farmers, ￿; (iii)
a vector of consumption levels, (CFi;SFi;CTi;STi) for i = C;S; and (iv) an intermediation level, ￿,
such that: (i) Walrasian markets clear; (ii) consumption levels are determined by Nash bargaining;
and (iii) the number of matches created is equal to the number of matches destroyed.
It is straightforward to see that under autarky we must have V M
FC = V M
FS ￿ V M
F and V M
TC =
V M
TS ￿ V M
T if both goods are to be produced in equilibrium. This in turn can be shown to imply
that (CFC;SFC) = (CFS;SFS) ￿ (CF;SF) and (CTC;STC) = (CTS;STS) ￿ (CT;ST), so we can write
the Bellman equations characterizing the expected lifetime utilities of agents as follows:
rV U
F = ￿F (￿)
￿
V M
F ￿ V U
F
￿
, (1)
rV M
F = v (CF;SF) + ￿
￿
V U
F ￿ V M
F
￿
, (2)
rV U
T = ￿T (￿)
￿
V M
T ￿ V U
T
￿
, (3)
rV M
T = v (CT;ST) + ￿
￿
V U
T ￿ V M
T
￿
. (4)
Unmatched farmers get zero instantaneous utility and become matched at rate ￿F (￿), while
matched farmers get a ￿ ow utility of v (CF;SF) and become unmatched at rate ￿. Similarly,
unmatched traders receive zero utility and get matched at rate ￿T (￿), while matched traders get
utility v (CT;ST) and become unmatched at rate ￿.
We can now describe how the process of intermediation and Nash bargaining between farmers
and traders a⁄ects the division of surplus and the implied terms of exchange of goods C and S.
Nash bargaining imposes the following condition
V M
T ￿ V U
T = ￿
￿
V M
T + V M
F ￿ V U
F ￿ V U
T
￿
, (5)
as well as
vC(CF;SF)
vS(CF;SF)
=
vC(CT;ST)
vS(CT;ST)
= p, (6)
and
pCF + SF + pCT + ST = p=aC = 1=aS. (7)
3Equation (5) states that traders get a share ￿ of the surplus of any match, while equations (6) and
(7) re￿ ect the fact that Nash bargaining outcomes are Pareto e¢ cient, in the sense that the agents￿
marginal rates of substitution are equated, and the budget constraint is satis￿ed with equality.
Equation (7) implies that the only relative price of co⁄ee consistent with equilibrium is
p = aC=aS.
It is identical to the relative price that would apply in a frictionless Ricardian model in which
farmers had direct access to Walrasian markets. Imposing goods-market clearing, it can also be
veri￿ed that the share of co⁄ee farmers ￿ and the joint consumption of co⁄ee, ￿ C ￿ CF + CT, and
sugar, ￿ S ￿ SF +ST, of a matched pair are identical to those obtained by a representative consumer
in a Ricardian model.
Denote by ￿ 2 (0;1) the share of joint consumption that is captured by the trader, with the
remaining share 1 ￿ ￿ accruing to the farmer. Equation (6) ensures that this share is common for
both goods. Naturally, a higher ￿ is associated with a distribution of surplus that is more favorable
to the trader. Manipulation of equations (1)-(5) implies that in the autarky equilibrium, the share
￿ is given by
￿ = ￿
r + ￿ + ￿T (￿)
r + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿) + ￿￿T (￿)
. (8)
Equation (8) illustrates that the share ￿ of goods captured by the trader is increasing in the prim-
itive bargaining power of traders and decreasing in the ratio ￿ of unmatched traders to unmatched
farmers. Intuitively, a higher value of ￿ enhances the payo⁄ of farmers in case of a negotiation
failure, as it reduces the expected time they will have to wait for a new trading opportunity. The
value of ￿ can be interpreted as the traders￿￿ margins￿since ￿ can be shown to equal the (percent-
age) di⁄erence between the relative price in the Walrasian markets and the relative price at which
farmers sell their goods to traders.
Finally, the equality between the number of matches created and destroyed imposes _ uF =
_ uT = 0, from which we obtain the equilibrium level of intermediation ￿ as a function of matching
parameters and the ratio NT=NF:
￿￿ + ￿F (￿)
￿ + ￿F (￿)
=
NT
NF
. (9)
Because the left-hand side of (9) is increasing in ￿, and it has a range equal to (0;+1), we can
conclude that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium level of ￿. Furthermore, the equilibrium
value of ￿ is increasing in the ratio of traders to farmers on the island. In light of equation (8), this
in turn implies that traders￿margins tend to be lower in islands where traders are relatively more
abundant.
44 Economic Integration
We now turn to a world economy comprising two islands, North and South, of the type described
above. The islands only di⁄er in terms of their ratios of traders to farmers and their production
technologies. We denote Southern variables with asterisks. In order to avoid a taxonomic exercise,
we restrict ourselves to the case in which traders are abundant in the North and this country has
comparative advantage in the production of sugar. This amounts to assuming (i) NT=NF > N￿
T=N￿
F;
and (ii) aC=aS > a￿
C=a￿
S.
Within our simple model, the two islands can become economically integrated in two distinct
manners. A ￿rst possibility is that the centralized markets where traders exchange goods be-
come global rather than local, while maintaining the assumption that farmers can only trade with
local traders. We refer to this type of integration￿ the integration of two initially isolated Wal-
rasian markets￿ as W-integration. A second possibility is to model economic integration as the
internationalization of trading opportunities, in the sense that traders worldwide are allowed to
intermediate trade in either of the two islands. We refer to this type of integration￿ the integration
of two initially isolated matching markets￿ as M-integration.
4.1 W-Integration
Our model comprises two blocks: (i) Walrasian markets; and (ii) bilateral exchanges governed by
bargaining and matching. We next study how these two blocks are a⁄ected by W-integration.
In the absence of trade costs, W-integration will necessarily equate the relative price at which
traders worldwide can exchange goods in both markets. As in the standard Ricardian model, there
will be three types of equilibria depending on whether or not one of the two countries remains
diversi￿ed in production. If North remains diversi￿ed, then pW = aC=aS, and the joint income of
a matched farmer-trader pair in the South is strictly higher if the farmer grows co⁄ee. As a result,
all Southern farmers will immediately specialize in co⁄ee production. Conversely, if farmers in the
South remain diversi￿ed, then pW = a￿
C=a￿
S and Northern farmers fully specialize in producing
sugar. The third type of equilibrium is one in which both North and South fully specialize in their
comparative advantage good and a￿
C=a￿
S < pW < aC=aS. It is straightforward to show that the
joint instantaneous utility levels achieved by Southern and Northern matched farmer-trader pairs
(i.e., v( ￿ C￿W; ￿ S￿W) and v( ￿ CW; ￿ SW), respectively) are (weakly) increased by W-integration, with
the increase being strict for pairs located in a country that fully specializes.
How does W-integration a⁄ect the terms of bilateral exchanges? Since traders can only match
with farmers from their own island, the steady-state ratio of unmatched farmers to traders on both
islands remains una⁄ected by W-integration and continues to be given by equation (9). Further-
more, because traders￿margins in equation (8) are independent of the instantaneous joint utility
levels, it must be the case that traders￿margins are also una⁄ected by W-integration. In other
words, the income of farmers either remains una⁄ected or grows proportionally with the improve-
ment in the terms of trade brought about by W-integration. Despite the endogeneity of traders￿
5margins, W-integration has no distributional e⁄ects.
Given these results, inspection of the value functions in (1)-(4) implies that
Proposition 1 W-integration: (i) has no e⁄ect on traders￿margins; (ii) and makes all agents in
the world (weakly) better o⁄.
Since W-integration is similar to the type of economic integration considered in standard trade
models, it should not be too surprising that it delivers similar e⁄ects. In AC, we have shown
however that allowing for the endogenous entry of traders modi￿es the previous conclusions in two
important ways. First, the increase in joint utility levels caused by W-integration induces the entry
of new traders and necessarily raises the equilibrium level of intermediation (￿) in islands that
fully specialize. Second, this endogenous change in the level of intermediation necessarily reduces
traders￿margins and magni￿es the gains from trade predicted by standard models.
4.2 M-Integration
We now turn to a situation in which traders are allowed to search for farmers in both islands
(though they can only search in one of these two islands at any point in time). We refer to this
process as the integration of matching markets, or simply M-integration. We will show below that
the welfare implications of this type of integration are much more nuanced. As in section III.4.1,
we assume that the two islands are initially under autarky when M-integration takes place.
In the absence of global Walrasian markets, it is immediate that M-integration will have no
e⁄ect on the relative prices p and p￿ at which co⁄ee and sugar are traded in the two local markets.
Nevertheless, under M-integration, traders might now have an incentive to start searching for
trading opportunities on another island. To study this decision formally, let us compute the autarkic
steady-state lifetime utilities of unmatched traders located in the North and the South (matched
traders will never switch islands if search frictions are large enough, which we implicitly assume).
From equations (3), (4), and (8), we have that
rV U
T =
￿￿T (￿)v
￿ ￿ C; ￿ S
￿
r + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿) + ￿￿T (￿)
;
rV U
T￿ =
￿￿T (￿￿)v
￿ ￿ C￿; ￿ S￿￿
r + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿￿) + ￿￿T (￿￿)
,
where ￿ and ￿￿ are implicitly de￿ned by equation (9). There are two reasons why these lifetime
utilities might be di⁄erent. First, production technologies are di⁄erent in the two countries and,
other things equal, traders want to intermediate exchanges in economies where farmers are more
productive. Second, the autarkic ratio of traders to farmers also di⁄ers across islands and, other
things equal, traders prefer to locate in islands where this ratio is low because margins in those
islands are higher and the expected frequency with which they conduct trades is also higher.
Given that the North is abundant in traders under autarky, ￿ > ￿￿, if production technologies are
su¢ ciently similar across countries, M-integration will necessarily be associated with a movement
6of traders from North to South, which will increase ￿￿ in the South and will reduce it in the North
(though these values will not be equalized as long as v
￿ ￿ C; ￿ S
￿
6= v
￿ ￿ C￿; ￿ S￿￿
). By contrast, if farmers
in the South are su¢ ciently ine¢ cient (a￿
C or a￿
S are su¢ ciently high), Northern traders will not
want to operate in the South and the ratio of unmatched traders to farmers on the two islands will
diverge as a result of M-integration.
What are the welfare e⁄ects of M-integration in each island? Straightforward manipulation of
the value functions implies that
Proposition 2 M-integration: (i) has opposite e⁄ects on the steady-state welfare of farmers and
traders; (ii) may lead to aggregate losses from trade in one island if the primitive bargaining power
of the set of agents made worse o⁄ is su¢ ciently high.
Result (i) states that M-integration necessarily generates distributional con￿ ict between farmers
and traders. If M-integration increases the ratio of traders to farmers on an island, then native
matched and unmatched traders from that island will be worse o⁄, while matched and unmatched
farmers on that island will be made better o⁄. Intuitively, the entry of traders simultaneously
reduces traders￿margins and increases (decreases) the rate at which traders (farmers) ￿nd matches.
This e⁄ect is similar to that generated by factor migration in a standard two-factor model. Result
(ii), however, is novel in that M-integration may well reduce aggregate welfare in one of the two
islands. Which island (if any) loses depends on the value of the bargaining weight ￿, the extent
of technology di⁄erences across islands and di⁄erences in the ratio of native traders and farmers
across islands.
In order to better understand this result, consider the following extreme example. Suppose that
the primitive bargaining of traders is extremely large (￿ ! 1), the two countries share the same
production technologies (v
￿ ￿ C; ￿ S
￿
= v
￿ ￿ C￿; ￿ S￿￿
), and NT=NF > N￿
T=N￿
F. Then, traders will move
from North to South, which will make Southern farmers better o⁄ and Southern native traders
worse o⁄. Nevertheless, by letting ￿ ! 1, the gain obtained by farmers becomes arbitrarily close
to 0, while the loss of rents by Southern traders remains positive. Interestingly, the possibility
of aggregate losses under M-integration extends to environments where traders do not earn any
rents. In AC, we allow for the endogenous entry of traders (as well as transitional dynamics),
yet aggregate losses remain possible whenever the (primitive) bargaining power of traders di⁄er
in the two islands. The key behind the ine¢ ciency in this alternative environment is the trading
externality underlying the search friction (see AC for details).
5 Discussion
The previous model is admittedly stylized. It does not aspire to capture the precise workings of any
particular market. The search frictions in our model rather aim to re￿ ect, in a somewhat reduced-
form way, the set of frictions that inhibit the ability of producers to single-handedly place their
goods in world markets, regardless of whether these frictions actually derive from time-consuming
7search, or rather from incomplete information about quality and prices, or working-capital needs.
We believe, however, that this framework may be particularly well-suited for analyzing the role of
itinerant traders in certain agricultural markets in Africa (see e.g. Marcel Fafchamps and Ruth V.
Hill, 2005).
Our simple model illustrates that the consequences of economic integration in the presence of
intermediation may be very di⁄erent from those predicted by standard models. It provides a useful
lens through which to interpret the disappointing e⁄ects of recent episodes of trade liberalization
in Africa. For example, Margaret McMillan, Dani Rodrik and Karen H. Welch (2003) study the
case of the cashew sector in Mozambique, in which the removal of restrictions on exports of raw
cashews generated only small increases in farm-gate prices, while substantially diminishing the
aggregate income of Mozambiquean agents trading and processing cashews, and bene￿tting Indian
importers of raw cashews. In our view, the analysis of market institutions in international trade is a
promising avenue of future research and can greatly enhance our understanding of the consequences
of globalization in developing economies.
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